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ANALYSIS OF THE ENTIRE MARKET VALUE
RULE IN COMPLEX TECHNOLOGY LITIGATION:
ARDUOUS ROYALTY BASE DETERMINATIONS,
UNJUST DAMAGE REWARDS, AND EMPIRICAL




Inspired by the unpredictability of patent value apportionment in
complex technologies and the thicket of mobile patent litigation, this
article analyzes the entire market value rule. When applicable, the
rule allows infringement damages to be based on market value of the
infringing product, which includes both infringing and non-infringing
features. Considering the convergence of multiple complex
technologies in a single device, such a rule could result in unfair
damage awards. Advancing a study of the Apple iPhone 4, a device
that is the subject of significant and varied patent litigation, this
article argues that consumers will ultimately suffer because patentee
overcompensation is a realistic possibility in light of current Federal
Circuit jurisprudence. To address resulting overcompensation issues,
this article explores statistical methods in an effort to produce more
reliable damage base determinations. The article concludes by
making suggestions to give the rule more teeth, and suggests that
while patent value apportionment is difficult, it is not impossible.
INTRODUCTION
For a moment, close your eyes and imagine that you own a
technology company that sells a mobile device. The device is
comprised of many hardware components, and it runs on a proprietary
operating system. Would you be surprised to learn that if someone
f Ravi Mohan is currently a third-year law student at Santa Clara University School of
Law. He has a B.S. in Electrical Engineering and a minor in Engineering Management from the
University of the Pacific in Stockton, CA. Ravi has relevant work experience in the wireless
industry. He currently serves as the Senior Operations Editor for Volume 27 of the Santa Clara
Computer and High Technology Law Journal. He thanks Stanford Law School and Samsung
Electronics for selecting this paper as a winner of the Samsung-Stanford Patent Prize.
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sued your company over a patent reading on just one of those
components, they could potentially reap damages on sales based upon
the entire value of your company's device? This is not fiction. The
doctrine governing this recovery is known as the entire-market-value
rule (EMVR). When applicable, the rule allows infringement damages
to be based on market value of the infringing product, which includes
both infringing and non-infringing features.' Specifically, the rule
"permits recovery of damages based on the value of a patentee's
entire apparatus containing several features when the patent-related
feature is the basis for customer demand." 2
Understandably, the EMVR could expose downstream
manufacturers to significant liability, especially if they integrate
multiple technologies into one device. I suggest that the EMVR
motivates patent holders to sue the most downstream entity
incorporating the invention in the hopes of hitting the maximum
remedy "jackpot." To support this contention, in Part I of this article,
I navigate the patent landscape and survey EMVR jurisprudence.
Noting that the current application of the EMVR is nebulous at best, I
demonstrate in Part II how and why the EMVR is particularly
dangerous for device manufacturers with respect to monetary
liability.' Certain ambiguities within the rule make EMVR
application difficult and unpredictable. As a result, case law is
impossible to harmonize. Exacerbating this predicament, evasive (or,
dare I say creative) litigation strategies result in inequities and unfair
results.4 In light of the high stakes and need for clarity, I conclude
that the current EMVR construct lacks the teeth necessary to prevent
unjust outcomes. I suggest congressional intervention to maximize
clarity and further the constitutional aim of promoting the progress of
science and useful arts.5
In Part III, I present a study of the iPhone 4, a device that is the
I. DePuy Spine, Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 567 F.3d 1314, 1331 (Fed. Cir.
2009).
2. Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., Inc., 56 F.3d 1538, 1549 (Fed. Cir. 1995), cert. denied,
516 U.S. 867 (1995).
3. It is unclear exactly what is required in determining the basis of consumer demand.
For example, in Bose Corp. v. JBL, Inc., the court did not require the patented feature form "the
basis" for demand or a "predominant" factor. Bose Corp. v. JBL, Inc., 274 F.3d 1354, 1361
(Fed. Cir. 2001). See also Tec Air v. Denso Mfg. Mich. Inc., 192 F.3d 1353, 1362 (Fed. Cir.
1999).
4. See Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120-21
(S.D.N.Y. 1970).
5. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
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subject of significant and varied patent litigation.6 Technological
convergence results in synergies and innovation, ultimately benefiting
consumers by way of monetary savings. 7 For example, consider the
Apple iPhone 4-a device that even at the most superficial level
combines a phone, a camera, and a video game system. Complex
devices such as the iPhone contain many features, making it the
perfect target for recovering EMVR damages. Using fictitious yet
plausible patent infringement actions against Apple, I demonstrate
how the EMVR could result in overcompensation to an insignificant8
component manufacturer.9 I conclude that consumers will ultimately
suffer because manufacturers will price products higher to reconcile
the risks attributed to potential royalty stacking. o
In an effort to produce more reliable damage base
determinations, I explore approaches to measure consumer demand,
including conjoint analysis and the use of market research surveys." I
critique the pros and cons of these approaches, arguing that such
alternatives are imperfect and jurors will still be influenced by flawed
statistical analysis. 12 Nonetheless, these approaches may be a good
start towards presenting "some plausible economic connection
between the invented feature and the accused [product] before using
the market value of the entire product as the royalty base."l 3 Finally,
6. Apple is being sued over a laundry list of patents. Notably: Nokia (user interfaces,
cameras, antennas, power management); HTC (more than twenty patents including touch screen
methods, GUI commands); Motorola (WCDMA, 802.11, antenna design, proximity sensing,
email); Kodak (image preview patents); and Elan (capacitive touch interfaces) are all currently
suing Apple. As of this writing more suits have been added, including Samsung (power
reduction during data transmission, tethering, and other wireless data technologies). Most of
these corporations have far more patents at issue than those listed here.
7. For example, consumers have the opportunity of buying one device that combines a
phone, a camera, an Internet browser, a video recorder, and a gaming machine in one convenient
form factor.
8. By insignificant, what I intendto convey is that there are many reasonable substitutes
for integrated circuits, and there is no evidence that the particular feature was marketed.
9. 1 demonstrate how easily the EMVR could result in overcompensation because a
savvy litigant would proffer: 1) hyperbolic opinions regarding royalty base determinations and
2) imperfect consumer demand statistics that result in the manipulation ofjurors.
10. See Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEX.
L. REv. 1991, 2012-15 (2007), http:// faculty.haas.berkeley.edulshapiro/stacking.pdf.
Il. See generally Warren F. Kuhfeld, Conjoint Analysis (2010),
http://support.sas.com/techsup/technote/mr2010h.pdf, see also Joseph Curry, Understanding
Conjoint Analysis in 15 Minutes, SAWTOOTH SOFTWARE, RESEARCH PAPER SERIES (1996),
www.sawtoothsoftware.com/download/techpap/undca I 5.pdf.
12. See generally Michael A. Einhom, Reasonable Royalties and the Entire Market Value
Rule (2010), media.expertpages.com/ep/media/1 162_einhom3.pdf.
13. See, e.g., IP Innovation L.L.C. v. Red Hat, Inc., 705 F. Supp. 2d 687, 690 (E.D. Tex.
2010).
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in Part V I entertain arguments by critics who suggest that the EMVR
rewards infringement, interferes with the development and financing
of critical new technologies, and circumvents the free-market process.
In the event that the legislature fails to codify the EMVR, I urge the
Federal Circuit to at least adopt the language introduced in Cordis
with respect to a feature forming the basis of consumer demand.14 In
light of the potential for unpredictable application, difficulty in
making royalty-base determinations, and potentially debilitating
effect on innovation, this article develops the case for strengthening
the EMVR in the context of complex technology litigation.
I. THE ENTIRE MARKET VALUE RULE
A. Patent Damages Basics
Patent damages are governed by statute.' 5 Claimants receive
damages "adequate" to compensate for infringement.16 A court may
award damages for patent infringement in the form of lost profits or a
reasonable royalty. Assuming the patentee can prove actual damages,
to recover lost profits a patent owner must demonstrate: (1) a demand
for the patented product, (2) the absence of acceptable non-infringing
substitutes, (3) manufacturing and marketing capability to exploit the
demand, and (4) the amount of profit he would have made. 1 If a
patentee cannot recover lost profits, the damage award shall not be
"less than a reasonable royalty."' 8 Determining a reasonable royalty
requires a determination of both a royalty base and royalty rate.19 The
reasonable royalty may take the form of a lump sum or running
payments, but in either case, it is often calculated on a "base" of sales
of a particular infringing product or uses of a particular infringing
process. 20
Patent infringement damages are a prominent source of debate
because of the mystery surrounding reasonable royalty calculation.
14. See Cordis Corp. v. Boston Scientific Corp., No. 03-27, 2010 WL 331792, at *3 (D.
Del. Jan. 28, 2010). The court noted that "literally, without the patented feature, [the defendant]
would not have a product to sell." Id.
15. See 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2000).
16. Id.
17. Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, Inc., 575 F.2d 1152, 1156 (6th Cir.
1978).
18. Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., Inc., 56 F.3d 1538, 1554 (Fed. Cir. 1995), cert. denied,
516 U.S. 867 (1995); see also Del Mar Avionics v. Quinton Instrument Co., 836 F.2d 1320,
1326 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
19. Lucent Technologies, Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
20. See Rite-Hile, 56 F.3d at 1554-55.
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The most prominent source of debate is the methodology used to set
the royalty base. Determining the royalty base is not an easy task,
especially for devices comprised of multiple features.2 1
Unfortunately, the patent statute provides no guidance of how a
reasonable-royalty damage award should be calculated.22 Thus, courts
are burdened with the unenviable task of patent value apportionment,
and ultimately responsible for providing a legal structure for patent
damages.23
B. The Issue ofApportionment
The royalty base is not always the same as the claimed invention.
This is a result of: 1) the market for the product; 2) patent claim
drafting strategy; and 3) a recognition that in devices combining
multiple features, there is rarely if ever only one patented feature. The
market affects the royalty base because, in a device comprised of
many features, certain patented features are more valuable than
others.2 4 Patent claims affect the value because the patentee may draft
claims broadly, creating more long-term value. 2 5
One method for setting a royalty base is known as
apportionment. Apportionment pinpoints the portion of the value of
an infringing product, or the patent owner's product that is
attributable to the patent in suit, as opposed to all other elements that
make up the value of the product. 2 6 Judge Learned Hand described
the issue of apportionment and allocating lost profits as unanswerable
and mythological. 2 7 Judge Learned Hand's observation in 1933 is
21. Fromson v. W. Litho Plate & Supply Co., 853 F.2d 1568, 1574-75 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
Indeed, "[d]etermining a fair and reasonable royalty is often . . . a difficult judicial chore,
seeming often to involve more the talents of a conjurer than those of a judge." Id.
22. Chris Marchese & Olga May, Runaway Patent Damages Awards. Is Statutory Reform
on the Way?, L.A. DAILY JOURNAL, Aug. 11, 2010, at 7.
23. Id. See also Dennis Crouch, Patent Reform: Damage Apportionment, PATENTLY-O,
Mar. 30, 2007, http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2007/03/patentreformd.html.
24. William C. Rooklidge, "Reform" of Patent Damages: S. 1145 and H.R. 1908, (May
2007) http://www.patentsmatter.com/press/pdfs/PatentDamagesReformRooklidge.pdf. This
is demonstrated in the real world by devices comprised of multiple features, both patented and
unpatented.
25. See id.
26. See Eric E. Bensen, Apportionment ofLost Profits in Contemporary Patent Damages
Cases, 10 VA. J.L. & TECH., Summer 2005, at N 12 (2005).
27. See Cincinnati Car Co. v. New York Rapid Transit Corp., 66 F.2d 592, 593 (2d Cir.
1933).
The situation was not that, however, but one so common in patent accountings, in
which the invention is not of the article as a whole, but of a small detail. The
difficulty of allocating profits in such cases has plagued the courts from the
643
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even more applicable in today's complex, technology-driven culture.
Modem courts tend to agree, noting, "[t]ranslating the Court's early
stylistic description into a precise, contemporary, economic paradigm
presents a challenge."28 Apportioning patent value will become more
difficult as technology continues to increase in complexity.
Litigants invoke the EMVR as another method for setting a
royalty base. 2 9 The EMVR recognizes the economic reality that
sometimes a single patent may drive the demand for an entire
product. 3 0 Notably, the rule represents the upper-bound-royalty base
that a patentee may recover from, as it includes the entire market
value of the final product combining the infringing feature. Using the
EMVR to calculate a reasonable royalty award can be controversial,
depending on the market value's size relative to the contribution of
the patent at issue.
C. Origins of the EMVR
Over time, the EMVR construct has changed, but the underlying
theory has remained the same. In 1884, to recover EMVR damages,
the patentee had to demonstrate that the entire value of the whole
machine, was "properly and legally attributable" to the patented
feature. 3 2 Approximately sixty years later, the Court of Appeals for
outset, and will continue to do so, unless some formal and conventional rule is
laid down, which is not likely. Properly, the question is in its nature
unanswerable . . . . It is generally impossible to allocate quantitatively the shares
of the old and the new, and the party on whom that duty falls, will usually lose. If
the patentee is required to assess the contribution of his invention to the profits,
he will find it impossible; vice versa, if this is demanded of the infringer. The
burden of proof in such cases is the key to the result.
Id. at 593.
28. Lucent Technologies, Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
29. Rite-Hite is dubiously credited with inappropriately bleeding EMVR analysis into
reasonable royalty cases. See Mark A. Lemley, Distinguishing Lost Profits From Reasonable
Royalties, 51 WM. & MARY L. REv. 655, 662 n.34 (2009).
Prof. Lemley suggests that the entire market value rule should have little role in reasonable
royalty law. See id. He cites the Rite-Hite court's reference to the EMVR, "courts have applied a
formulation known as the 'entire market value rule' to determine whether such components
should be included in the damage computation, whether for reasonable royalty purposes . . . or
for lost profits purposes."). See id. (quoting Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538, 1549
(Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc)). Prof. Lemley notes "[t]he reference to reasonable royalties was
dictum there, though, since Rite-Hite itself involved lost profits. Ironically, it is not clear that the
Federal Circuit had applied the entire market value rule to decide a reasonable royalty case
before this statement in Rite-Hite." Id.
30. See, e.g., Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., Inc., 56 F.3d 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1995), cert.
denied, 516 U.S. 867 (1995).
31. See Lucent, 580 F.3d at 1338-39.
32. See Garretson v. Clark, Ill U.S. 120, 121 (1884). See also Westinghouse Elec. &
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the Federal Circuit held that damages for component parts used with a
patented apparatus were recoverable under the EMVR if the patented
apparatus "was of such paramount importance that it substantially
created the value of the component parts."33 In 1986, the Federal
Circuit affirmed language most similar to the modern construction:
recovery of damages based on the value of a patentee's entire
apparatus containing several features is available when the patent-
related feature is the "basis for customer demand."3 4
D. Modern Application of the EMVR
Over time, products have become increasingly difficult to
apportion due to device convergence. Consequently, from the
perspective of the patentee, it has become increasingly difficult to
determine exactly what it means for something to form "the basis for
customer demand." Fortunately, Chief Judge Rader, sitting by
designation in a district court, formulated a three-prong test for the
EMVR in a reasonable royalty case:
The entire market value rule in the context of royalties requires
adequate proof of three conditions: (1) the infringing components
must be the basis for customer demand for the entire machine
including the parts beyond the claimed invention; (2) the
individual infringing and non-infringing components must be sold
together so that they constitute a functional unit or are parts of a
complete machine or single assembly of parts; and (3) the
individual infringing and non-infringing components must be
analogous to a single functioning unit. It is not enough that the
infringing and non-infringing parts are sold together for mere
business advantage. Notably, these requirements are additive, not
alternative ways to demonstrate eligibility for application of the
entire market value rule. 35
As a result, modern application of the EMVR has become more
standardized, but there are some outlier cases. Patentees and
manufacturers desire clearer standards, albeit for different reasons.
Down-stream manufacturers need clearer standards to prevent
Mfg. Co. v. Wagner Elec. & Mfg. Co., 225 U.S. 604, 615 (1912).
33. Marconi Wireless Telegraph Co. v. United States, 53 U.S.P.Q. 246, 250 (Ct. Cl.
1942), affd in part and vacated in part, 320 U.S. 1 (1943) (emphasis added).
34. State Indus. Inc. v. Mor-Flo Indus. Inc., 883 F.2d 1573, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1989). See
also TWM Mfg. Co. v. Dura Corp., 789 F.2d 895, 900-01 (Fed. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479
U.S. 852 (1986).
35. Cornell Univ. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 609 F. Supp. 2d 279, 286-87 (N.D.N.Y. 2009)
(internal citations omitted).
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unsupported damage awards, while patentees need to know exactly
how and what evidence is necessary to prove to the consumer demand
predicate. Without some legislative intervention, it is only a matter of
time until the EMVR is stretched to its practical limits.
1. Technological Convergence
As society benefits from technological convergence, downstream
manufacturers derive intellectual property protection from
increasingly extensive patent portfolios. Technological convergence
results in synergies and innovation, ultimately benefiting consumers
through monetary savings. 3 6 The EMVR has become a hot-button
issue over the past few years due to its potential application in multi-
function products such as cellular phones, personal computers, and
software. These products are generally not easily separable into
distinct components, and thus it becomes more difficult to determine
an appropriate damages base.
Recently, some plaintiffs have attempted to apply the EMVR to
complex hardware and software products, but defendants have argued
that the EMVR is inapplicable.37 Despite arguments to the contrary,
recent case law teaches that the EMVR may apply to such
technologies.38 Judge Rader, sitting by designation in the Northern
District of New York, addressed complex technology and the EMVR
in Cornell v. Hewlett-Packard.39 Plaintiffs patent covered a feature
that enhanced computer microprocessor performance by processing
commands for information simultaneously rather than sequentially. 40
36. For example, consumers have the opportunity of buying one device that combines a
phone, a camera, an Internet browser, a video recorder, and a gaming machine in one convenient
form.
37. See, e.g., Cornell, 609 F. Supp. 2d. 279; Cornell Univ. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., No.
01-CV-1974, 2008 WL 2222189 (N.D.N.Y. May 27, 2008); Lucent Technologies, Inc. v.
Gateway, Inc., 509 F. Supp. 2d 912, 937 (S.D. Cal. 2007), aff'd on other grounds, 543 F.3d 710
(Fed. Cir. 2008).
38. See Cornell, 609 F. Supp. 2d. 279; Cornell, No. 01-CV-1974, 2008 WL 2222189;
Lucent, 509 F. Supp. 2d 912.
39. See Cornell, 609 F. Supp. 2d. at 285-88.
Notably, Cornell chose this hypothetical royalty base in favor of another
alternative more clearly relevant to the value of the patented invention-the
revenue Hewlett-Packard would have earned had it sold each infringing
processor as just that, a processor, without any additional non-infringing
components .... [This] logical and readily available alternative was the smallest
salable infringing unit with close relation to the claimed invention-namely the
processor itself. Cornell nevertheless stuck to its guns, aiming for the highest
royalty base still available after the court's exclusion order.
Id.
40. See id at 283.
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Nonetheless, plaintiff sought damages on the revenue from
defendant's entire server and workstation systems, which included
"vast amounts of technology beyond the infringing part of the
processors."4 1 Cornell argued that it deserved royalties based on sales
that the defendant would have made if it had sold all of the alleged
infringing processors as CPU bricks.42 The jury agreed and awarded
Cornell approximately $184 million in damages.43
Although Cornell was able to convince the jury of its argument
at an evidentiary hearing, the district court held that Cornell had not
offered "credible and sufficient economic proof that the patented
invention drove demand for Hewlett-Packard's entire server and
workstation market." 4 4 Thus, the court excluded at trial "testimony
that the entire market value of Hewlett-Packard's servers and
workstations should be used as the royalty base." 45 According to the
court, "Cornell simply stepped one rung down the Hewlett-Packard
revenue ladder from servers and workstations to the next most
expensive processor-incorporating product [the CPU brick]."46 Judge
Rader found that the processor was an appropriate royalty base
41. Id.
42. Id. at 283-84.
43. See id at 282. The jury applied a 0.8% royalty rate against $23 billion in revenue that
Hewlett-Packard had derived from sales of a "CPU brick" that included the accused component.
Id.
44. Id. at 284.
The actual math is not at issue, as both parties agree on $23 billion as the
appropriate royalty base based on CPU brick sales. The important point is not the
way that Cornell derived this royalty base, but that it exceeded again this court's
direction and proceeded to attempt to show economic entitlement to damages
based on technology beyond the scope of the claimed invention. The entire
market value rule indeed permits damages on technology beyond the scope of the
claimed invention, but only upon proof that damages on the unpatented
components or technology is necessary to fully compensate for infringement of
the patented invention. Thus, this court faults Cornell for using the CPU brick as
the royalty base without credible and economic proof that damages on the
unpatented portions of this technology was necessary to compensate for the
infringement.
Id. at 284-85.
45. Id at 284 (quoting Cornell Univ. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., No. 01-CV-1974, 2008 WL
2222189, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. May 27, 2008)).
46. Id. at 285.
Instead of linking its base amount to the processors (of which the infringing IRB
is an important component), Cornell simply stepped one rung down the Hewlett-
Packard revenue ladder from servers and workstations to the next most expensive
processor incorporating product without offering any evidence to show a
connection between consumer demand for that product and the patented
invention.
Id.
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because the infringing part was an important component.47 Thus, the
processor represented "the smallest salable patent-practicing unit,,48
and damages could be calculated by multiplying the 0.8% royalty rate
against the processor as the royalty base. 4 9 The court applied that rate
and reduced the jury award by one-third to approximately $53.5
million.50
2. To What Degree Does the EMVR Still Exist?
Six months after Cornell, the Federal Circuit addressed EMVR
in the context of reasonably royalty damages on a personal computer
in Lucent v. Gateway.5 1 Lucent accused Microsoft's Outlook, Money,
and Windows Mobile software of using the patented "date picker"
feature, of which Microsoft sold approximately 110 million units. 5 2
Sales of these three products totaled approximately $8 billion.
Lucent's royalty base at trial was based on the entire market of these
sales. 4 Lucent applied an 8% royalty against the sales revenue for the
accused software, and asked the jury to award $561.9 million.5 s The
Court of Appeals rejected Lucent's application of the entire market
value rule, citing lack of evidence that the date-picker was the basis,
or even a substantial basis, of any consumer demand for Microsoft's
products.56 Common sense suggests that no one reasonably bought
these Microsoft products just because they could pick a date in
Outlook. Nonetheless, the jury awarded Lucent a lump-sum royalty
payment of approximately $358 million.
The Federal Circuit came to the rescue, finding two errors in the
district court's EMVR application.58 The Court took issue with
47. See id
48. Id. at 283.
49. See id at 282-83. Judge Rader explained,
[i]n the anatomy of a Hewlett-Packard server, the processor is the smallest
salable patent-practicing unit . . . . the claimed invention is a small part of the
IRB, which is a part of a processor, which is part of a CPU module, which is part
of a 'brick,' which is itself only a part of the larger server.
Id.
50. See id at 292.
51. See Lucent Technologies, Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1338-39 (Fed. Cir.
2009).
52. See id. at 1317, 1323.
53. Id. at 1323.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 1337.
57. See id at 1325.
58. See id at 1336. See also Douglas J. Kline & Jonathan W. Lent, Federal Circuit
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Lucent's damage expert's approach. Specifically, the district court
precluded Lucent from applying its royalty rate to the larger royalty
base, so Lucent's expert massaged the royalty rate to 8% to achieve
the previously calculated damage figure. 6 0 The Federal Circuit noted
that by increasing the royalty rate, "Lucent's expert tried to reach the
damages number he would have obtained had he used the price of the
computer as a royalty base."6' Although the court admonished
Lucent's licensing expert's approach, it noted, "[t]here is nothing
inherently wrong with using the market value of the entire product. . .
so long as the multiplier accounts for the proportion of the base
represented by the infringing component or feature." 62
Chief Judge Rader has explained that while "the Federal Circuit
permits estimates in the damages context," trial courts must "ensure
that the estimates are tied to demand for the claimed invention and
proper economic methodologies, not just numbers in an accounting
format., 6 3 In accordance with this assertion, in ResQNet.com, Inc. v.
Lansa, Inc., the Federal Circuit overturned a district court's royalty
rate as "speculative and unreliable" because it was based on prior
licenses when "none of these licenses even mentioned the patents in
suit or showed any other discernible link to the claimed
technology." 64 Specifically, the Federal Circuit instructed the district
Takes a Hard Look at the "Entire Market Value Rule", GOODWIN PROCTER (Jun. 22, 2010),
http://www.goodwinprocter.com/Publications/Newsletters/IP-
Advisor/201 0/20100622.aspx?device-pdf ("First, the Federal Circuit found a lack of evidence
to support the jury's finding that Lucent's patented invention formed the basis for consumer
demand for the defendants' infringing products. Second, the court criticized the approach
adopted by Lucent's licensing expert.").
59. See Lucent, 580 F.3d at 1338.
60. See id.
61. Id. The Federal Circuit noted that:
What Lucent's licensing expert proposed here does not comport with the purpose
of damages law or the entire market value rule. Lucent's expert tried to reach the
damages number he would have obtained had he used the price of the entire
computer as a royalty base. Being precluded from using the computer as the
royalty base, he used the price of the software, but inflated the royalty rate
accordingly. This cannot be an acceptable way to conduct an analysis of what the
parties would have agreed to in the hypothetical licensing context.
Id.
62. Id. at 1339.
63. See Cornell Univ. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 609 F. Supp. 2d 279, 290 (N.D.N.Y. 2009)
(citing TWM Mfg. Co. v. Dura Corp., 789 F.2d 895, 898 (Fed. Cir. 1986)).
64. ResQNet.com, Inc. v. Lansa, Inc., 594 F.3d 860, 869-73 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
Specifically, the court found the 12.5% royalty rate to be excessive and inadequately supported
by the evidence, and therefore remanded the case back to the district court for a recalculation of
a reasonable royalty. See id
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court not to rely on unrelated licenses during remand to increase the
royalty rate above rates that better represent the economic demand for
the claimed technology.65  Although ResQNet is not an EMVR
opinion, some scholars have noted that if ResQNet is interpreted as
such, even if a component was the basis for consumer demand, a
damage award will probably still be struck for the same reasons as
those proffered in Lucent.66
Two recent cases from the notoriously plaintiff-friendly Eastern
District of Texas bolster the argument that EMVR recovery has
become significantly more difficult. In IP Innovation LLC v. Red Hat
and Novell, Judge Rader excluded expert testimony because it
"improperly inflate[d] both the royalty base and the royalty rate by
relying on irrelevant or unreliable evidence and by failing to account
for the economic realities of this claimed component as part of a
,,67
larger system. He noted that the expert's "methodology . . . [did]
not show a sound economic connection between the claimed
invention and this broad proffered royalty base." 68
Similarly, in Laserdynamics v. Quanta, the Court applied the
Lucent analysis to reduce Laserdynamics' $52 million award to $6.2
million. 69 The court observed that "there is nothing in the record that
shows the demand for QCI's assembled computers was in any way
driven by LaserDynamics' disc-discrimination method patent" and
that LaserDynamics "did not carry its evidentiary burden of proving
that anyone purchased [the assembled computer] because of the
patented method." 70 The LaserDynamics and IP Innovation cases are
65. Id. at 872-73. "A reasonable royalty based on such speculative evidence violates the
statutory requirement that damages under § 284 be 'adequate to compensate for the
infringement.' Thus, this court vacates the damages award and remands to the district court for a
recalculation of a reasonable royalty in accordance with this opinion." Id. at 873.
66. See Robert M. Isackson & Alexandra V. Lee, Patent Damages and The Entire Market
Value Rule Post Lucent: An Open Question (2010),
http://www.aipla.org/learningcenter/library/papers/SM/2010-Spring-Meeting-Speaker-
Materials/Documents/ED_2010_SMIsacksonPPR.pdf.
67. IP Innovation L.L.C. v. Red Hat, Inc., 705 F. Supp. 2d 687, 691 (E.D. Tex. 2010).
68. Id. at 689. In fact, he explained that "[t]he claimed invention [a workspace switching
feature] is but one relatively small component of the accused operating systems" and that the
"relative importance of certain other features such as security, interoperability, and
virtualization" confirm the patented invention's "small role in the overall product." Id at 698-
90. Finally, the court explained that the expert failed to account "for the record evidence that
most users of the accused operating systems do not seem to use the workspace switching feature
at all." Id. at 690.
69. See LaserDynamics, Inc. v. Quanta Computer, Inc., No. 06-CV-348, 2010 WL
2331311 (E.D. Tex. 2010). Here, the plaintiffs expert testified the royalty should be 2% on
assembled computers using the EMVR, and 6% on stand-alone disk drives. Id. at *2.
70. Id. at *3 (quoting Lucent Technologies, Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1337
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particularly significant because if a plaintiff cannot win in the Eastern
District of Texas, chances are it will not win anywhere else.n
Most recently, in Uniloc v. Microsoft, the Federal Circuit found
that Uniloc's continuous implication of a relationship between the
entire market value of the accused products and the patent tainted the
jury's damage award.72 The court found that Uniloc exacerbated the
damages horizon for the jury by implying this relationship, and noted,
"[t]his case provides a good example of the danger of admitting
consideration of the entire market value of the accused where the
patented component does not create the basis for customer
demand." 7 3 As a result, the Federal Circuit found that the district
court's verdict of $388 million in damages was "fundamentally
tainted by the use of a legally inadequate methodology" and called for
a new trial on damages.74
Taken in totality, the EMVR exists and is far from elimination.
While the Federal Circuit has held that "the base used in a running
royalty calculation can always be the value of the entire commercial
embodiment,"75  recent decisions stand for the proposition that
recovery under an EMVR theory has become significantly more
difficult. In fact, in Cornell, Judge Rader went so far as to require
(Fed. Cir. 2009)). Judge Ward held that LaserDynamics had presented no evidence that its
patented method drove the demand for QCI's finished computers and noted "the claimed
invention embodied in the disc-drive is but one relatively small component of the entire
assembled computer." Id.
71. The Eastern District of Texas is well known for being plaintiff-friendly. See, e.g.,
Julie Creswell, So Small a Town, So Many Patent Suits, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 2006, § 3
(Business), at 3 1.
72. See Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 632 F.3d 1292, 1295 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
73. Id. at 1320. As the district court aptly noted, "'[t]he $19 billion cat was never put
back into the bag even by Microsoft's cross-examination of Mr. Gemini and re-direct of Mr.
Napper, and in spite of a final instruction that the jury may not award damages based on
Microsoft's entire revenue from all the accused products in the case." Id. (quoting Uniloc USA,
Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 640 F. Supp. 2d 150, 185 (D. R.I. 2009)).
74. Id. at 1320.
75. Lucent Technologies, Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1338-39 (Fed. Cir. 2009)
(emphasis added).
Simply put, the base used in a running royalty calculation can always be the
value of the entire commercial embodiment, as long as the magnitude of the rate
is within an acceptable range (as determined by the evidence). Microsoft surely
would have little reason to complain about the supposed application of the entire
market value rule had the jury applied a royalty rate of 0.1% (instead of 8%) to
the market price of the infringing programs. Thus, even when the patented
invention is a small component of a much larger commercial product, awarding a
reasonable royalty based on either sale price or number of units sold can be
economically justified.
Id.
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demand curves to link consumer demand for servers and workstations
to the claimed invention.76 Indeed, the Federal Circuit has given the
EMVR more "bite" by requiring that reasonable royalty claims be
based on "sound economic and factual predicates.""
II. AMBIGUITIES AND UNPREDICTABILITY GALORE
A. Linguistic Variations of the EMVR
While the courts should be lauded for their willingness to reject
unsupported royalty figures, rampant unpredictability within the
EMVR construct exists. Admittedly, no rule is perfect, but part of the
reason why the EMVR needs modification, or at least codification,
stems from the fact that application of the EMVR has been
unpredictable to say the least. Furthermore, patentees do not have
clear standards on just what it will take to satisfy the EMVR. The
Patent Reform Acts, Federal Circuit, and various district courts each
have their own construction of the EMVR.
Congressional reform bills propose their own variation of the
EMVR." The Patent Reform Act of 2009 sought to codify the EMVR
using a construct where "the claimed invention's specific contribution
over the prior art is the predominant basis for the market demand for
an infringing product or process . . . . Unfortunately, changing
"substantial" to "predominant" is only a rudimentary semantic
change, and still too ambiguous a standard to make any real
difference in solving the problems with the EMVR. This discrepancy
is a moot point, however, as the Patent Reform Act of 2010 does not
even speak of the EMVR, but rather sets forth a "gatekeeper"
approach, attempting to ensure that courts or juries consider only
evidence supported by substantial evidence.so While this approach is
a viable resolution to the overcompensation problem, it remains
uncertain what will happen now to legislation with respect to patent
76. See Cornell Univ. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 609 F. Supp. 2d 279, 284 (N.D.N.Y.
2009).
77. See Riles v. Shell Exploration & Prod. Co., 298 F.3d 1302, 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
78. See Amy L. Landers, Let the Games Begin: Incentives to Innovation in the New
Economy oflntellectual Property Law, 46 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 307, 362 (2006) ("The current
iterations of the entire market value rule are inconsistent with the Patent Act's statutory
language.")
79. S. 515, 111th Cong. § 4 (2009) (emphasis added).
80. See Patent Reform Act of 2010, Amendment to S. 515, 111th Cong. (2010). Amended
versions of the bill have been introduced in both the House and Senate (H.R. 1260 in the House,
S.515 in the Senate).
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damages.81 Recent cases from the Federal Circuit, and especially
those with Chief Judge Rader sitting by designation, suggest that
Congressional intervention may not be necessary. 82 To the extent that
this policing continues, there may not be a need for major patent
reform, at least with respect to damages.
Cases from the Federal Circuit use different language to describe
the EMVR. In Rite-Hite, as explained above, to recover damages
based on the value of a patentee's entire apparatus containing several
features, the patent-related feature must be the "basis for customer
demand." 83 Other cases imply that the patented feature must be the
substantial basis of consumer demand.84 Similarly, the IP Innovations
court noted, "damages are recoverable only 'if the patented apparatus
was of such paramount importance that it substantially created the
value of the component parts."' 85 Thus, the question is, what basis
does the consumer demand predicate require? Even if the issue of
basis is clarified, what does that translate to with respect to proof at
trial?
Adding to the confusion, some cases do not even require proof of
the consumer demand predicate. In Bose v. JBL, the Federal Circuit
affirmed the district court's finding that the patented invention
"inextricably worked with other components of loudspeakers as a
single functioning unit."86 JBL argued that the royalty base should be
81. See Statement of Senator Patrick Leahy On The Introduction Of the Patent Reform
Act of 2011, THE STATE COLUMN (Jan. 26, 2011),
http://www.thestatecolumn.com/statepolitics/vermont/statement-of-senator-patrick-leahy-on-
the-introduction-of-the-patent-reform-act-of-20 11/.
Most recently, the Federal Circuit aggressively moved to constrain run-away
damage awards, which has plagued the patent system by basing awards on
unreliable numbers, untethered to the reality of licensing decisions. As the court
continues to move in the right direction, it is more apparent than ever that the
gatekeeper compromise on damages we have worked to reach with Senator
Feinstein and others is what is needed to ensure an award of a reasonable royalty
is not artificially inflated or based on irrelevant factors.
Id. The Patent Reform Act of 2011 is proposed at S. 23, 112th Cong. (2011).
82. See, e.g., Lucent Technologies, Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2009);
see also Cornell Univ. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 609 F. Supp. 2d 279 (N.D.N.Y. 2009).
83. See Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., Inc., 56 F.3d 1538, 1549 (Fed. Cir. 1995), cert.
denied, 516 U.S. 867 (1995).
84. See Lucent Technologies, 580 F.3d at 1337 (noting,"[t]he first flaw with any
application of the entire market value rule in the present case is the lack of evidence
demonstrating the patented method of the [patented invention] as the basis-or even a
substantial basis-of the consumer demand.").
85. IP Innovation L.L.C. v. Red Hat, Inc., 705 F. Supp. 2d 687, 689 (E.D.Tex. 2010)
(quoting Rite-Hite, 56 F.3d at 1549) (emphasis added).
86. Bose Corp. v. JBL, Inc., 274 F.3d 1354, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
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based either on the manufacturing cost of the elliptical port and the
speaker enclosure housing the port or the manufacturing cost of the
entire speaker, less any associated "electronics." 87 Bose, however,
produced unrebutted evidence that the elliptical-port design, which
considerably improved the performance of the speakers at issue,
shared a substantial nexus with the demand for the products
incorporating it." The Federal Circuit, however, affirmed the district
court's holding, concluding that substantial evidence supported the
district court's award of a reasonable royalty based upon the entire
value of the loudspeakers. 89 Thus, Bose stands for the proposition that
in some cases, a patentee need not directly prove that its patented
feature formed the basis of consumer demand.
Some courts, such as the District of Delaware, have applied the
EMVR with more force. In Cordis Corp. v. Boston Scientific Corp.,
Judge Robinson denied BSC's motion to preclude Cordis's damage
expert calculations based on the EMVR.90 The Cordis court noted,
"[t]his . . . is not a case where the patented feature is optional or
unimportant; literally, without the patented feature, [the defendant]
would not have a product to sell." 91 Therefore, the Cordis case
represents a construction of the EMVR with the tenacity necessary to
preclude unsupported entire market damages.
Thus, Congress could go a long way in resolving EMVR
unpredictability by codifying an exacting standard and elaborating on
requirements to recover entire market damages. In early 2011, a
bipartisan group of Senators introduced the Patent Reform Act of
87. See id.
'Porting' pertains to a port tube inside a loudspeaker enclosure used to radiate
acoustic energy from inside the loudspeaker enclosure to an area outside the
loudspeaker enclosure at high, crisp audible levels. The design of the port tube is
critical in avoiding audible distortion. The specific feature at issue here is the
shape of the boundary surrounding the port tube.
Id. at 1357.
88. Id. at 1361.
89. Id. (noting that, both Bose's and JBL's marketing executives agreed that consumers
value the performance of the loudspeakers above any other attribute in making a purchasing
decision. Finally, "Bose presented evidence detailing its efforts to market the benefits of its
loudspeakers using the invention [described in its patent] and provided testimony on its increase
in sales in the year following the introduction of its speakers [containing the patented
invention]." Consequently, the district court found that the invention described in the '721
Patent was an integral part of the speaker units Bose sold and that port design was an integral
part of the speaker systems JBL sold, noting that both companies devoted substantial resources
to port design because of its close connection to speaker performance.).
90. Cordis Corp. v. Boston Scientific Corp., No. 03-27, 2010 WL 331792, at *3 (D. Del.
Jan. 28, 2010).
91. Id.
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2011, again with no mention of the EMVR. 92 Although gate-keeping
will go a long way towards providing certainty in high stakes
litigation, codifying the EMVR is the only way to 1) silence
arguments regarding damage unpredictability, and 2) harmonize the
currently irreconcilable EMVR landscape.
B. Litigation Strategies Circumventing the Rule
Standardizing the EMVR will be a great step forward towards
predictability, but great leaps will only come when the court
recognizes and develops solutions to some of the strategies used by
creative litigants. Testimony or evidence supporting an entire market
royalty base must be grounded or based in accepted economic
principles. 9 3  Despite judges policing damage evidence, creative
litigation strategy allows savvy litigants to circumvent the rule,
resulting in inequities and unfair results. Indeed, Judge Ronald Whyte
of the Northern District of California referred to economic damages
experts as the "most flexible witnesses" that testify in his court.9 4
Exemplifying this flexibility, experts may submit inversely
proportional royalty percentage evidence as a function of the royalty
base.95
92. See Patent Reform Act of 2011, S. 23, 112th Congress (2011). See also Press Release,
Leahy, Hatch, Grassley: Patent Reform Will Protect American Jobs, Promote Economic
Development, UNITED STATES SENATOR FOR VERMONT, Jan. 20, 2011, available at
http://leahy.senate.gov/press/press-releases/release/?id=74cbf540-cc98-4172-b719-
8d630e6bdf78 ("The Act will provide more certainty in damages calculations and enhanced
damages. Specifically, the Act includes a rigorous gate keeping role for the court, pursuant to
which judges will assess the legal basis for the specific damages theories and jury instructions
sought by the parties. The gate keeping provisions will ensure consistency, uniformity, and
fairness in the way that courts administer patent damages law.").
93. See IP Innovation L.L.C. v. Red Hat, Inc., 705 F. Supp. 2d 687, 691 (E.D. Tex. 2010).
Judge Rader, sitting by designation, issued an order excluding the expert report and reminded
the parties "that expert testimony on the topic of damages will not be allowed absent a firm basis
in accepted economic principles with an eye to the facts of [the] record." Id. (emphasis added).
94. Honorable Ronald Whyte, Keynote Address at the Santa Clara Computer and High
Technology Law Journal Symposium (Jan, 21, 2011). See also Dennis Crouch, Damages:
Federal Circuit Again Demands More Substance from Damages Experts, PATENTLY-O (Feb.
08, 2010), http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2010/02/damages-federal-circuit-again-demands-
more-substance-from-damages-experts.html. The Patently-O article states that Judge Whyte
"refer[red] to economic damages experts as the 'most intellectually dishonest witnesses' that
testify in his court." See id. Judge Whyte later noted that a better description would be that
damages experts are the most "flexible" witnesses. Honorable Ronald Whyte, Keynote Address
at the Santa Clara Computer and High Tech Law Journal Symposium (Jan, 21, 2011).
95. In other words, if the royalty base is large, experts will pronounce a low royalty
percentage. Alternatively, if the royalty base is small, experts will pronounce a high royalty
percentage. The result is identical compensation to the patentee, independent of the actual
royalty base determination.
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1. Inverse Proportional Royalty Rates
The practice of using inversely proportional royalty rates was
most clearly demonstrated in Lucent.96  The Federal Circuit
admonished such practices, but as a practical matter this strategy is
quite simple. If the base is the entire commercial embodiment, the
defendant will present a low royalty rate. If the base becomes the
smallest salable patent-practicing unit, the defendant will simply
massage the royalty rate to achieve the desired damage award. 9 7
Interestingly, in Lucent, the court criticized Lucent's damages
experts' royalty rate,98 demonstrating the court's willingness to reject
inversely proportional royalty rate and base calculations. As a result, I
suspect that the courts will recognize and admonish future instances
of this unsophisticated practice.
2. Use Georgia-Pacific Factors
A more plausible strategy for presenting entire market value rule
evidence is via Georgia-Pacific factor six.99 For example, in OPTi
Inc. v. Apple, Inc., the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Texas noted that it did not err in permitting evidence of
total revenue derived from computers rather than just the infringing
chipsets because it was relevant to Georgia Pacific factor six,
derivative sales. 00 The court noted that if Apple had sold very few
computers containing the infringing chipsets, the total revenue
evidence would not have been admissible.101 As a result, the Court
denied Apple's motion for a new trial, remittitur, and JMOL
regarding damages. 102
Similarly, in Rembrandt Date Technologies, LP, v. AOL, LLC.,
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia
denied the defendant's pretrial motion to exclude the testimony of the
plaintiffs damage expert. 103 The court recognized that the damage
96. See generally Lucent Technologies, Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir.
2009).
97. See generally id. at 1338.
98. See id
99. See Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120 (S.D.N.Y.
1970).
100. OPTi, Inc. v. Apple, Inc., No. 07-CV-21, 2009 WL 4727912, at *4 (E.D. Tex. Dec 3,
2009).
101. Id.
102. Id. at *5.
103. Rembrandt Data Technologies, LP, v. AOL, LLC, No. 08-CV-1009, 2009 WL
2242624, at *1 (E.D. Va. Jun. 17, 2009).
2011] ANALYSIS OF THE ENTIRE MARKET VALUE RULE 657
expert's methodology was not flawed because he discounted the
royalty base of HP's end-user products using the 25% rule and
Georgia-Pacific factors.'0 Thus, Georgia-Pacific factor six
represents a viable strategy for litigants to circumvent the EMVR and
bombard jurors with entire market statistics.
3. Reasonableness Checks
Attempts to present entire market value evidence under the guise
of a "reasonableness check" to an expert witnesses' calculations will
have little success going forward. Reasonableness checks were upheld
in i4i Limited Partnership v. Microsoft Corporation.'os There, the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas rejected
Microsoft's argument that i4i's testimony was a "back-door" attempt
to argue an "entire market value" theory of royalties to the jury and
found that the expert's testimony was properly admitted. 106
However, i4i was decided before the Uniloc decision in early
2011, where after "passively tolerating" the 25% rule in earlier cases,
the Federal Circuit noted that the rule is a "fundamentally flawed tool
for determining a baseline royalty rate in a hypothetical
negotiation." 0 7 Furthermore, the Federal Circuit stated, "[t]his case
provides a good example of the danger of admitting consideration of
the entire market value of the accused where the patented component
does not create the basis for customer demand."' 08
Thus, looking forward, litigants are finally precluded from using
the 25% rule as a reasonableness check, but it is unclear whether
litigants may simply mention a Georgia-Pacific factor to present
EMVR evidence. I applaud the Federal Circuit's rejection of the 25%
rule and concur with commentators who suggest that the rule
undermined the Court's requirement for sound economic reasoning. 109
104. Id.
105. See i4i Limited Partnership, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 670 F. Supp. 2d 568, 592-93
(E.D. Tex. 2009), aff'd, 589 F.3d 1246 (Fed. Cir. 2009), withdrawn and superseded on
rehearing, 598 F.3d 831 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
106. Id.
107. See Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 632 F.3d 1292, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2011). "The
25% rule is a shorthand phrase for a method of dividing expected profit between a licensor and
licensee . . . [by dividing] net pretax profit with normally 25% of that profit being paid by the
licensor as a reasonable royalty." Standard Mfg. Co., Inc. v. United States, 42 Fed. Cl. 748, 766
(1999).
108. Uniloc, 632 F.3d at 1320.
109. See generally William C. Rooklidge & Martha K. Gooding, When Hypothetical Turns
to Fantasy: The Patent Reasonable Royalty Hypothetical Negotiation, AIPLA (2010),
http://www.aipla.org/leamingcenter/library/papers/am/2010/Documents/RooklidgePaper.pdf.
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C. Proposed Construction
Recent cases such as Lucent and Uniloc are on the right track.
For example, the Federal Circuit's recognition in Uniloc that the 25%
rule is a "fundamentally flawed tool for determining a baseline
royalty rate in a hypothetical negotiation"o10 demonstrates that future
theories or practices in setting a royalty rate need some nexus to the
facts specific to the case. Common sense ought to trump "flexible"
expert witness testimony with respect to damages. It is unfathomable
that anyone buys Microsoft Outlook solely because of the date-picker
feature.'" It is almost insulting to suggest that anyone buys Microsoft
Office because of a product activation feature." 2 Courts are on the
right track in recognizing that not all features form the basis of
consumer demand for a particular product.
In light of the varying linguistic constructs and creative litigation
strategies, a codified rule must contain a customer demand predicate.
Specifically, the rule should make EMVR recovery rare and
warranted only in those few circumstances where the inventor's
contribution is so significant that without it, the defendant would not
have a product to sell." 3  Thus, to truly prevent EMVR
unpredictability, in addition to gate-keeping, the courts or Congress
should: 1) adopt language similar to the Cordis construction; 2)
maintain a consumer demand predicate; 3) recognize creative
techniques to present entire market evidence via Georgia-Pacific; and
4) require evidence grounded in well-established economic principles.
Thus, when combined with court's gate-keeping function, this
proposal will further the policy goals of the patent system, and
prevent unfounded damage awards.
III. EMPIRICAL APPLE IPHONE 4 STUDY
An exploration and understanding of current market trends will
help demonstrate why downstream manufacturers will be exposed to
110. Uniloc, 632 F.3d at 1315.
This court now holds as a matter of Federal Circuit law that the 25 percent rule of
thumb is a fundamentally flawed tool for determining a baseline royalty rate in a
hypothetical negotiation. Evidence relying on the 25 percent rule of thumb is thus
inadmissible under Daubert and the Federal Rules of Evidence, because it fails to
tie a reasonable royalty base to the facts of the case at issue.
Id
111. See Lucent Technologies, Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1332-33 (Fed. Cir.
2009).
112. Uniloc, 632 F.3d at 1319.
113. See, e.g., Lemley, supra note 29, at 671-72.
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significant risk due to potential EMVR application as device
convergence continues. First, while the number of patent lawsuits has
remained constant over the past twenty years, the number of named
defendants has increased nearly 600% over that same time period.114
Second, the number of patent grants has been increasing over that
same period, and, patent grants were higher in 2010 than in any other
year on record." 5 Third, as technological convergence continues,
devices will increasingly incorporate multiple features. Thus, taken in
totality, an examination of a downstream manufacturer is imperative
to demonstrate the inequities of the EMVR. As of this writing,
perhaps no device better epitomizes or represents device convergence
than the Apple iPhone 4. Thus, in this section, I present a study of the
EMVR through the eyes of Apple Computer, the largest"'6 tech
company in the world-and the most sued." 7
A. Hypothetical Apple iPhone Litigation
The iPhone 4 is already the subject of significant and varied
patent litigation." 8  Unfortunately, the EMVR could be very
dangerous for a device manufacturer like Apple because a single
device incorporating multiple features could read on hundreds if not
thousands of patents. Adding insult to injury, plaintiffs could use
language from recent EMVR cases to easily recover when the accused
product is a complex device."19 From this perspective, perhaps the
most dangerous EMVR opinion for Apple is Bose v. JBL, where the
114. Kyle Jensen, Guest Post: Counting Defendants in Patent Litigation, PATENTLY-O,
Oct. 27, 2010, http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2010/10/guest-post-counting-defendants-in-
patent-litigation.html. However, the patent suit filings for 2010 have increased. See, e.g., Jason
Rantanen, Patent Suits Filings for 2010 Show a Slight Rise, PATENTLY-O, Jan 28, 2011,
http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/201 1/01/patent-suit-filings-for-201 0-show-a-slight-raise.html.
115. See Joe Mullin, Patent Grants Rose Last Year-Are We About To See More
SmartPhone Lawsuits?, PAIDCONTENT.ORG, Jan. 19, 2011, http://paidcontent.org/article/419-
patent-grants-rise-last-yearare-we-about-to-see-more-smartphone-lawsuit/.
116. See YAHOO! FINANCE, Apple Inc. Stock Quote, http://finance.yahoo.com/q?s=AAPL
(last visited Jan. 17, 2011).
117. Richard Adhikari, Apple Loads its Guns for Patent War, MACNEWSWORLD, Nov. 29,
2010, http://www.macnewsworld.com/story/71334.html?wlc=1295317647. According to
LegalMetric, since 2005, Apple has been involved in a total of 141 patent suits in U.S. district
courts. Id.
118. Apple is being sued over a laundry list of patents. Notably: Nokia (user interfaces,
cameras, antennas, power management); HTC (more than 20 patents including touch screen
methods, GUI commands); Motorola (WCDMA, 802.11, antenna design, proximity sensing,
email); Kodak (image preview patents); and Elan (capacitive touch interfaces) are all currently
suing Apple. See, e.g., David McCandless & James Key, INFORMATIONISBEAUTIFUL.NET,
http://infobeautiful2.s3.amazonaws.com/whos_suingwhom.png.
119. See infra Section II.
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patented invention "inextricably worked with other components of
loudspeakers as a single functioning unit."l20 By definition,
components comprising a complex device work as a "single
functioning unit." As a result, plaintiffs will find and present evidence
demonstrating how their technology works in conjunction with other
features, potentially allowing them to recover damages based on the
entire commercial embodiment. Does this mean that companies like
Apple will be faced with insurmountable litigation and extreme
damage awards?
1. Integrated Circuit Manufacturer
Under current EMVR jurisprudence, what would happen if an
aggressive integrated circuit manufacturer sued Apple, claiming
entitlement to damages under the value of the entire device, an Apple
iPhone 4? Let us assume that the case has made it to the Federal
Circuit, or at the very least, let us assume that Judge Rader is sitting
by designation. We know a few things: 1) the "entire market value"
rule still exists; 2) damages for patent infringement must be supported
by "sound economic proof' (i.e., supply/demand info, survey
evidence, etc.); 121 and 3) Judge Rader will prevent the jury from
hearing unsupported EMVR evidence via gate-keeping.
Plaintiff would probably allege that it deserves EMVR damages
because its integrated circuit technology formed the basis for
consumer demand. In fact, it would proffer that its integrated circuit
was implemented in the A4 processor, which controls or processes all
the functions of the iPhone 4.122 Plaintiff would likely present
evidence of the fact that more than 70 million iPhones have been
sold, 12 3 at a retail price of $499 each. Significantly, an integrated
circuit does not cost more than a few dollars. 124 It is both unlikely and
120. Bose Corp. v. JBL, Inc., 274 F.3d 1354, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
121. See, e.g., ResQNet.com, Inc. v. Lansa, Inc., 594 F.3d 860, 869 (Fed. Cir. 2010)
(citing Grain Processing Corp. v. Am. Maize-Prods. Co., 185 F.3d 1341, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 1999)
("To prevent the hypothetical from lapsing into pure speculation, this court requires sound
economic proof of the nature of the market and likely outcomes with infringement factored out
of the economic picture.")).
122. See IPHONE, The Future is in The Details, http://www.apple.com/iphone/design/ (last
visited April 8, 2011).
123. Greg Kumparak, Apple Sold 14.1 Million iPhones Last Quarter, Over 70 Million
Since Launch, MOBILECRUNCH, Oct. 18, 2010,
http://www.mobilecrunch.com/2010/10/18/apple-sold-14-1-million-iphones-last-quarter-over-
70-million-since-launch/.
124. This, of course, represents the "at cost" price, and doesn't consider licensing fees, etc.
that are ultimately considered in bringing a product to market.
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unfathomable that anyone bought an iPhone for a part they probably
did not even know they are buying. In the unlikely event that such an
award is granted, it would represent the quintessential case of
patentee overcompensation.125
On these facts, Apple will likely prevail on summary judgment
because of the Cornell case. Under Judge Rader's opinion in Cornell,
it is highly unlikely for the plaintiff to prevail unless it can provide
substantial evidence tending to demonstrate that the patent was the
basis for consumer demand. As a last resort, plaintiff could argue that
the "smallest salable patent-practicing unit" is the A4 processor,
which reportedly is made by Samsung for $10.75/chip.1 26 This
argument is analogous to the reasoning proffered by plaintiffs in
Cornell, i.e., that the patented feature is part of a component, which is
part of a brick, which is in turn part of a server. 127 However, the
plaintiff here probably will not recover. In fact, a recent district court
opinion teaches that damages should not be based automatically on
the smallest salable infringing unit if the EMVR does not apply.12 8
Thus, it is unlikely that the patentee would prevail on these facts.
2. Retina Display Manufacturer
What if the technology at issue is something more significant,
thus making EMVR recovery more plausible? Specifically, what if
the technology at issue is the highly lauded and marketed "retina
display" touch screen? In Lucent, the Federal Circuit first examined
the evidence concerning the application of the EMVR and concluded
that "[tihe first flaw with any application of the entire market value
rule in the present case is the lack of evidence demonstrating the
patented method of the [patented invention] as the basis-or even a
substantial basis-of the consumer demand." 2 9 In light of the
foregoing, to recover EMVR damages, it is crucial for the plaintiff to
demonstrate that its invention was the basis of consumer demand for
125. This assumes that once the royalty rate is applied to the royalty base of the entire
commercial embodiment, it will result in a higher damage award when compared to a smaller
royalty base.
126. Nick Farrell, The iPhone 4 Costs Just $187.51 To Make, The INQUIRER, Jun. 29,
2010, http://www.theinquirer.net/inquirer/news/1719652/iphone-cost-usdl8751.
127. See Cornell Univ. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 609 F. Supp. 2d 279, 283 (N.D.N.Y.
2009).
128. See Phillip M. Adams & Associates, LLC v. Winbond Electronics Corp, No. 05-CV-
64, 2010 WL 3522097 (D. Utah Sept. 8, 2010) ("The Court agrees. Cornell University did not,
as asserted by Sony, hold that where the entire market value rule does not apply, damages
should be based on the smallest salable infringing unit."). Id. at *2.
129. Lucent Technologies, Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
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the iPhone 4.
B. Types of Evidence the Litigant May Rely Upon
The retina-display is a feature that has been significantly
advertised in nearly all iPhone 4 marketing materials. As the Fonar v.
General Electric case demonstrates, obtaining persuasive support in
discovery regarding the importance of the patented feature to
customer demand is a primary factor in determining EMVR
applicability.1 3 0 In Fonar, the court held that under the EMVR, it was
proper for the jury to base a reasonable royalty on the value of the
entire accused MRI machines.1 3 1 Since GE's own technical literature
emphasized the patented feature, the court found that there was
evidence to conclude that the EMVR was satisfied.132 As a result,
there was substantial evidence to support a reasonable royalty award
based upon the cost of the entire accused machines. 3 3
While some might argue that the retina display maker needs to
merely go to Apple's website and present marketing materials
showcasing the item, this seems rudimentary at best. If all it takes to
recover EMVR damages is showing a few ads or visiting the
manufacturer's website and presenting this evidence, then patent
damages need reform much sooner and more substantially than I
originally imagined. Realistically though, this marketing evidence
would only be one factor in the remedy calculus, rather than being
dispositive and sufficient for recovery.
Without more, i.e., data with a sound economic basis, EMVR
damages even in this case are highly unlikely. As discussed supra, a
common sense approach combining judicial gate-keeping and a
consideration of discovery comprising of benchmark products,
130. See, e.g., Fonar Corp. v. General Electric Co., 107 F.3d 1543, 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
131. See id
132. Id. at 1552-53. For example,
[a] brochure for GE's Signa machine highlighted MAO in 1987, stating that
"[m]ulti-slice, multi-angle capabilities offer direct acquisition of multiple view
angles in one acquisition." Several other brochures of GE machines also
identified the MAO feature. One GE brochure, entitled "Multi-angle MR
imaging," states that: "A recent advance at GE Medical Systems, however, is
helping to enhance efficiency and patient throughput. Multi-angle imaging,
featured on all Signa systems, allows a single scan to be graphically prescribed
with each slice or group of slices acquired at a different angle." There was thus
substantial evidence to support an award of a reasonable royalty based upon the
cost of the entire accused machines.
Id.
133. Id. at 1553.
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marketing materials, and patented-value importance will promote just
outcomes. To make the patentee's case even stronger, perhaps some
of the alternative approaches to measure consumer demand discussed
in the following section will prove to be beneficial.
IV. ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO MEASURE CONSUMER DEMAND
To satisfy its burden to recover damages under the EMVR, the
plaintiff has an arduous task. First, it is unclear what level of demand
will sufficiently satisfy the rule. Second, even if the patented feature
is considered more than just an insignificant component in a very
complex device, the fact remains that case law is helpful but
unpredictable.
In this section I explore some options to measure and prove that
the plaintiffs component formed the basis of consumer demand in an
effort to produce more reliable damage base determinations. This
section is organized from the most complex and sophisticated
methods of proving demand, to the most simple. I critique the pros
and cons of these alternative approaches, specifically as applied to
complex technology litigation. 134 I argue that independently, such
alternatives are somewhat imperfect and jurors will still be influenced
by flawed statistical analysis. Perhaps the strongest EMVR case will
present some combination of the following:
A. Conjoint/Trade-OffAnalysis
Conjoint analysis is a statistical technique used to determine how
people value different features that comprise a particular product or
service.135 The analysis is premised on participants providing data
regarding their preferences for hypothetical products defined by
attribute combinations.136 If the key in recovering EMVR damages is
proving that a feature forms the basis of consumer demand, then
conjoint analysis could prove to be very valuable. The objective of
this analysis is to determine what combination from a limited number
134. For example, the analysis allows preference measurements on an individual level, but
on the other hand the complexity of designing a study for a device with features spanning from
the mechanical to most technical arts.
135. Kuhfeld, supra note 11. "Consider the decision to purchase a car. Increased size
generally means increased safety and comfort. The trade off is an increase in cost and
environmental impact and a decrease in gas mileage and maneuverability. Conjoint analysis is
used to study these trade-offs." Id. See also Curry, supra note 11; Conjoint Analysis
Demonstration, DOBNEY.COM, http://www.dobney.com/Conjoint/CnjtDemo.htm (last visited
Apr. 18, 2011).
136. See Kuhfeld, supra note 11, at 683.
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of attributes is the most influential in making a purchasing
decision. 137
The analysis is a multi-step process. First, a controlled set of
features or products is shown to respondents. Then, by analyzing how
respondents make value decisions between these products, conjoint
analysis is used to decompose the judgment data into components,
based on qualitative attributes of the products.13 8
Designing a conjoint analysis for a complex device such as the
one explored in the hypothetical iPhone 4 litigation is difficult. The
first problem in designing the study is choosing which features are
given as choices to respondents. At the very least, the major
components need to be included in the analysis. Once the components
are included, the next step in the analysis should be more narrowly
defined so that qualitative weights may be assigned to the features.
For example, once the analysis is applied to the iPhone 4, the first
considerations could include: price, brand, and features (such as touch
screen, operating system, and camera).
Unfortunately, conjoint analysis has its limits. The analysis could
easily become very complicated. The results may be manipulated
based on the analytical design. With too few choices, respondents
may be forced to choose a function or feature they might not actually
care about. On the other hand, users may resort to simplification
strategies when given too many options, resulting in skewed results.
Some commentators have noted that having respondents make
choices is an inefficient way to elicit preferences.13 9 Finally, just like
other statistical devices described in this section, litigation time
restraints may prevent the analysis from painting the full analytical
framework. Thus, although conjoint analysis is a very powerful tool,
it has its weaknesses.
B. Hedonic Regression
Hedonic analysis is a statistical technique that considers price,
actual sales, and other attributes to measure consumer demand. This
technique decomposes the item being researched into its components,
and obtains estimates of the contributory value of each component.14 0
137. See id. at 681-82.
138. Id. at 682 ("Large part-worth utilities are assigned to the most preferred levels, and
small part-worth utilities are assigned to the least preferred levels. The attributes with the largest
part-worth utility range are considered the most important in predicting preference.").
139. See CDB V6.0 Technical Paper, SAWTOOTH SOFTWARE, TECHNICAL PAPER SERIES 1,
1 (1999), www.sawtoothsoftware.com/download/techpap/cbetech.pdf
140. See Neil Gandal, Hedonic Price Indexes for Spreadsheets and an Empirical Test for
2011] ANALYSIS OF THE ENTIRE MARKET VALUE RULE
Hedonic regression may prove to be quite powerful and useful for
EMVR analysis as it allows for estimation of the average value of a
patented feature.141 Defendants could effectively use this technique to
demonstrate that a feature's value is minimal when compared to other
patented features comprising the device.
C. Incremental Profits
The incremental income approach is "well established in the law
relating to patent damages."1 4 2 Both parties to litigation will want to
consider the incremental profit technique, i.e., determining the
contribution attributable to the patented feature. If a downstream
manufacturer produces a device combining multiple features (both
patented and unpatented), then it should be possible to isolate the
individual contribution of each component that comprises the device.
This analysis isolates the incremental revenues associated with a
product that contains the patented invention, relative to an alternative
that does not embody the patentee's invention, and deducts the
incremental costs associated with these revenues may be an
appropriate measure of the patent's contribution. 143
The incremental profits method could be useful for both parties
because it inherently sets an upper and lower bound value based upon
the difference of one feature. In a hypothetical litigation, the
touchscreen manufacturer could argue that without a touchscreen, the
entire device would appeal to a completely different subset of users.
The next best alternative would likely be a different manufacturer's
touchscreen. Perhaps the substitute touchscreen could be a better
product, but it might also be more expensive. If the features are more
expensive, then the overall cost of the product will go up, and that
Network Externalities, 25 RAND J. EcON. 160, 160 (1994).
141. Jesse David & Kara Gorski, Economic Approaches to Royalty Calculations, LAW360,
May 25, 2010, http://www.law360.com/technology/articles/169174/economic-approaches-to-
royalty-calculations.
142. Paper Converting Machine Co. v. Magna-Graphics Corp., 745 F.2d 11, 22 (Fed. Cir.
1984). See, e.g., Lam, Inc. v. Johns-Manville Corp, 718 F.2d 1056, 1065 (Fed. Cir. 1983); Levin
Bros. v. Davis Manufacturing Co., 72 F.2d 163 (8th Cir. 1934).
The approach recognizes that it does not cost as much to produce unitN+ I if the
first N (or fewer) units produced already have paid the fixed costs. Thus fixed
costs-those costs which do not vary with increases in production, such as
management salaries, property taxes, and insurance-are excluded when
determining profits.
Paper Converting, 745 F.2d at 22.
143. See Charles F. Kuyk, United States: Early Assessment of IP Damages Can Prove
Beneficial, MONDAQ, Jan. 11, 2008,
http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/article.asp?articleid=56070.
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price will categorically appeal to a different party. Substitutes might
come bundled with higher costs because of required licenses and
limited manufacturing ability. Unfortunately, this analysis could get
very complex, and ironically results in a skewed damage award.
D. Benchmarks
In some cases, a product that offers consumers benefits similar to
those of the patented invention may be available in the marketplace-
i.e., a "benchmark." Benchmark products may be used to provide an
estimate of the value consumers place on a patented invention,
isolated from the accused product.144 In i4i Limited Partnership v.
Microsoft Corporation, i4i's damage expert used a standalone XML
editor as a benchmark to measure the value of this feature when
bundled into Word. 145 i4i sued Microsoft alleging infringement of its
patent related to XML functionality within Microsoft Word. 14 6 The
jury found infringement and awarded i4i $200 million in damages. 14 7
Microsoft appealed the award, arguing that the damages award was
based on inadmissible expert testimony and insufficient evidence.ias
i4i's expert had calculated a royalty rate of $98 per actually infringing
copy of Microsoft Word (2.1 million), based on the selling price of a
third party independent XML editor, XMetaL.149 The stand-alone
third party product retailed for $499.0 i4i's expert calculated the
licensing fee by multiplying the price of XMetaL ($499) by
Microsoft's profit margin (76.6%), yielding approximately
$382. 15 The expert then applied the 25% rule, resulting in a baseline
royalty rate of $96. 152 This was then adjusted to $98 based on the
application of the Georgia-Pacific factors.15
The Federal Circuit affirmed the damages noting that
Microsoft's objections were really directed at the conclusion drawn
by i4i's expert rather than his methodology. 154 The Court held that the
144. See David & Gorski, supra note 141.
145. See i4i Ltd. Partnership v. Microsoft Corp., 598 F.3d 831, 853-54 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
See also David & Gorski, supra note 141.
146. i4i, 598 F.3d 839.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 841.
149. Id. at 852-53.
150. Id. at 853.
151. See id.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 853-54.
154. Id. at 854.
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use of the XMetaL product was appropriate as it represented a true
market example of what customers who desired XML functionality
would have paid for the product.' 55 Further, the royalty base of 2.1
million copies of Microsoft Word was an appropriate base as the
XML feature did drive the sales of copies of Microsoft Word that had
the XML feature. 15 6
Using benchmarks is an attractive option for plaintiffs because
finding a second-best product should not be too difficult. On the other
hand, certain manufacturers might argue that their products have no
real substitutes because of brand, goodwill, and the like. For example,
Apple's brand, function, and intangible "cool-ness" make it hard to
substitute. Every time a major manufacturer creates a new device, it is
dubbed the new "iPhone killer."' 57 However, since 2007, every
device that has tried to compete against the iPhone has failed.158
Ignoring these arguments, benchmarks provide empirical evidence
one-step removed from the accused device.
E. Consumer Surveys
Consumer surveys and market research may provide valuable
insight into the value consumers place on various features that
comprise a product. For example, during the i4i litigation, the
plaintiffs damages expert relied on customer survey results to
determine the portion of customers who used the accused feature.15 9
Some commentators have noted that product registration cards may
also provide evidence of consumer preferences.16 0
Consumer surveys are wonderful in theory, but they have their
faults. First, consumer surveys are difficult to implement, especially if
done during litigation. It takes time to get a sufficient population
155. Id. at 854-55.
156. See id at 855-56.
157. In fact, entire websites are devoted to tracking new technologies that hope to defeat
Apple's dominant device. See IPHONE KILLER: MOST COMPREHENSIVE IPHONE KILLER
SMARTPHONE SITE, http://www.iphonekiller.com/ (last visited Mar. 21, 2011) (describing itself
as the "Most comprehensive iPhone Killer Smartphone Site.")
158. See generally Nexus Failed As An iFhone Killer: Now Google Promising iPad Killer,
AREACELLPHONE.COM, May 12, 2010, http://areacellphone.com/2010/05/nexus-failed-iphone-
killer-google-promising-ipad-killer/; Stephen Foley, Microsoft's iPhone Killer is Laid to Rest,
THE INDEPENDENT, July 2, 2010, http://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/gadgets-and-
tech/features/microsofts-iphone-killer-is-laid-to-rest-2016199.html; Devices intentionally
marketed as iPhone/iPod Killers Will Never Succeed, ARTSTECHNICA, Jan. 9, 2009,
http://arstechnica.com/civis/viewtopic.php?f=14&t--81338.
159. See i4i Ltd. Partnership v. Microsoft Corp., 598 F.3d 831, 854-56 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
160. See David & Gorski, supra note 141.
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replying to the result. Second, survey results can be skewed
depending on the choices that are given as answers. In a device with
multiple "significant" features, one can imagine a laundry list of
potential answers to the question "what feature persuaded you to buy
this product?" Third, there is a major issue regarding scale. How
many people need to respond to a survey to fairly and reasonably
represent the majority? Fourth, how many people should be actual
owners of the product in question-all, or just some random
percentage? Finally, if the case is already in litigation, achieving
reliable and timely results may be very difficult. Thus, while
consumer surveys may provide some valuable insight, the unfortunate
truth is that they provide more questions than answers.16 1
V. POLICY ARGUMENTS AND ISSUES
The EMVR recognizes the reality that even the most complex
devices may sometimes owe consumer demand for the product to a
single patented feature. I submit to commentators who observe that
the "entire market value rule" is a misnomer because a patent is rarely
ever responsible for the complete value of a product.16 2 There should
not be an "all-or-nothing" mentality in patent damages, because an
infringer should not be allowed to escape liability if the feature in
question drove consumer demand for the product. On the other hand,
the patentee's expert should not be allowed to ignore the obligation of
apportionment by arguing that it is factored into the royalty rate. 63 if
the patented feature is so significant that people bought the product
just because of it, justice can only be served if damages are awarded
based on the value of the complete commercial embodiment.
Maintaining the EMVR will help deter manufacturers from blindly
integrating components into a final product. Unfortunately, in cases
where the patented feature is combined in a device and is the primary
driver of consumer demand, hungry litigants may manipulate jurors to
the detriment of the general public. In those cases, it is entirely
appropriate to reward damages to the inventor limited to the
contributions of the patented feature.'M
Some critics suggest that the EMVR rewards infringement,
161. I conducted my own informal survey and realized many of the issues discussed
above. A link to my research survey is available at http://linkd.in/fxezip.
162. See Brian J. Love, Patentee Overcompensation and the Entire Market Value Rule, 60
STAN. L. REv. 263 (2007), available at http://ssm.com/abstract-991429; Lemley, supra note 29.
163. See Love, supra note 162; Lemley, supra note 29; Rooklidge & Gooding, supra note
109, at 11.
164. See Rooklidge, supra note 24, at 16.
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interferes with the development and financing of critical new
technologies, and circumvents free market process. 16 5 Critics of the
EMVR argue that it results in extreme and unfounded damage awards
that are exorbitant when compared to a reasonable royalty. For
example, in the Lucent case, the jury initially entered a $350 million
award based on $20 billion in total sales.16 6 If these large awards
continue, companies may curtail production, raise prices, or even
cease manufacturing efforts altogether. However, so long as the
manufacturer is making a profit, new technologies will continue to
prosper. From the manufacturer's perspective, this could
unfortunately lead to a blind "combine and ship" mentality.
Manufacturers should perform due diligence before combining
multiple components and attempting to obtain licenses ex post facto.
Thus, critics implicitly suggest that courts should be careful not to
discourage inventors from disclosing their intellectual pursuits to the
public and inadvertently promoting an ignorance carve-out for
downstream manufacturers.
While these arguments have merit, recent case law teaches that
the court will prevent exorbitant damages by filtering unsupported
entire market statistics.16 7 Therefore, even assuming arguendo that the
EMVR affects the development and financing of new technologies,
gate-keeping solves most of the problems. For example, in IP
Innovation LLC v. Red Hat Inc., Judge Rader rejected the plaintiff s
royalty base under the entire market value rule because the plaintiff
failed to show "some plausible economic connection between the
invented feature and the accused operating systems."' 68 Similarly, in
Cornell, although the jury originally awarded damages exceeding
$180 million, Judge Rader ruled post-trial that plaintiffs theory ran
afoul of the EMVR, and reduced the damages award to $53
million.169 These two recent decisions demonstrate the Court's stance
that a patentee should only recover entire market value damages when
the patentee's invention drives consumer demand for the accused
product.
Finally, I agree with assertions that critics of the EMVR are too
focused on the overcompensation problem and should thus focus their
165. See MICHAEL A. EINHORN, REASONABLE ROYALTIES AND THE ENTIRE MARKET
VALUE RULE (2010), available at media.expertpages.com/ep/mediall 162_einhorn3.pdf.
166. See Lucent Technologies, Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cit. 2009).
167. See Love, supra note 162, at 287.
168. See IP Innovation L.L.C. v. Red Hat, Inc., 705 F. Supp. 2d 687, 690 (E.D. Tex. 2010).
169. See Cornell Univ. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 609 F. Supp. 2d 279, 292 (N.D.N.Y.
2009).
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efforts on the negative impact of altering the rule in other types of
infringement actions. The gate-keeping function applies to all
infringement cases and resolves the societal costs associated with
patentee overcompensation. 170 Overcompensation is not a result of the
rule's application, but rather a consequence of juror manipulation.171
After being prejudiced by exposure to entire market statistics, juries
cannot help but return awards based upon royalty rates less than 1%.
For example, if plaintiffs offer evidence suggesting that an accused
party sold products in excess of $20 billion, jurors probably think
applying a royalty rate less than 1% is fair. Why? Jurors respect
expert authority. After a so-called "expert" witness presents damage
statistics, it becomes clear how a layperson could think that royalty
rates less than 1% are not only reasonable, but also entirely justified.
Thus, gate-keeping solves the issue of juror manipulation by filtering
unsupported evidence before experts get the opportunity to mystify
and persuade by relying on entire market statistics.
CONCLUSION
The EMVR does not need to be eliminated, but it needs to be
standardized. For the past seventy years, judges have appreciated that
reasonable royalty analysis is not an easy task. Unfortunately, merely
recognizing the problem will not provide a real-world solution. While
Rite-Hite and its progeny provide a reasonable baseline EMVR
construction, as science and technology continue to flourish, devices
will become increasingly complex. Downstream manufacturers and
pioneers of industry deserve uniformity so they can have confidence
in our patent system. On first impression, the rule seems to provide an
opportunity for savvy litigants to circumvent evidentiary rules and
170. See Jackson Price, The Entire Market-Value Problem VIRGINIA SOCIETY OF LA WAND
TECHNOLOGY, Feb. 21, 2010, http://www.vslat.org/2010/02/the-entire-market-value-problem
("Instead of presenting the jury with the total size of the market and then presenting the math of
how each party calculates a reasonable royalty, the parties could present such evidence to the
judge before the trial and simply present the jury with the results of these calculations, approved
by the judge. Instead of saying 'The market is $22 billion and a reasonable royalty is $200
million,' we would say, 'A reasonable royalty for this patent would be $200 million.' This
approach would still bring the relevant information before the jury while excluding the
superfluous size of the market that would only result in prejudicing the jury.").
171. See PATENT DAMAGES HANDBOOK, COMPENSATORY DAMAGES ISSUES IN PATENT
INFRINGEMENT CASES: A HANDBOOK FOR FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT JUDGES 24 n.105 (2010),
available at http://www.law.berkeley.edulfiles/bcltPatentDamagesEd.pdf. ("Courts should be
cautious about admitting testimony or allowing argument directed to total revenue, . . . because
of the risk that the probative nature of that testimony or argument may be outweighed by its
prejudicial nature," and "[i]n this regard, courts should be vigilant in guarding against 'the
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury."')
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recover exorbitant monetary damages. In cases where a plaintiffs
invention truly formed the basis of consumer demand, ambiguities
and lack of standards create unpredictability, thereby opening the
door for increased patentee overcompensation. However, if evasive
strategies are recognized and dealt with accordingly, and if marketing
evidence is supported with adequate scientific and economic
foundation, then many of the problems associated with the EMVR
will be mitigated.
Finally, Congress needs to provide guidance where case law
currently falls short. Assuming that Congress does not step in, the
Federal Circuit should give the EMVR more "teeth," by including
language similar to that applied in Cordis, where the court would not
allow EMVR application unless the plaintiffs proved that "literally,
without the patented feature, [the defendant] would not have a
product to sell." 1 72 Codifying the EMVR will ensure that only
deserving patentees will recover damages. Providing standards will
harmonize the murky case law, as well as preserve precious judicial
resources. However, some questions remain unanswered. For
example, how much demand or evidence is required to prove that the
invention is the basis of consumer demand? In proving the consumer
demand predicate, does the patented feature need to be 100% of the
reason why consumers bought the accused product? What types of
evidence will suffice for EMVR recovery? Could marketing evidence
ever be dispositive to recover EMVR damages? Should the courts
choose not to modify the EMVR, so long as judges continue to
perform their gate-keeping function, there may be less need for future
legislative intervention.' 7 3 Nonetheless, manufacturers and pioneers
of innovation deserve answers to these important questions.
172. Cordis Corp. v. Boston Scientific Corp., No. 03-27, 2010 WL 331792, at *3 (D. Del.
Jan. 28, 2010).
173. See Michael J. Kasdan & Joseph Casino, Federal Courts Closely Scrutinizing and
Slashing Patent Damage Awards, 2010 PATENTLY-O PATENT L.J. 24 (2010),
http://www.patentlyo.com/files/kasdan.casino.damages.pdf.
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